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Abstract. In this work, we present and establish a new primitive called Multi-level Con-
trolled Signature. This primitive allows a signer to specify a security level to limit the verifia-
bility of the signature. This primitive works as follows. Without losing generality, we assume
the security levels of a group of users are defined in ascending order, where “A” represents
the lowest security level and “Z” represents the highest security level, respectively. When
a signer signs a message by specifying a security level “C”, all users who have a security
level greater than “C” will be able to verify while other users whose security levels are
“A”, “B” or “C” cannot verify the authenticity of this message. This primitive resembles
some similarities with other existing primitives, such as Hierarchical Identity-based Encryp-
tion/Signatures, policy-based cryptography, but we stress that this primitive is unique in
the sense that other primitives cannot satisfy all requirements as stated above efficiently.
In this paper, we develop a security model for such a primitive. We present two concrete
constructions that are proven secure in our model. The first scheme has a constant signature
size, while the second scheme is more efficient in terms of verifier’s private information. We
provide a comparison between our schemes and illustrate where each scheme is applicable
in the real world scenario.
1 Introduction
Multi-level marketing (MLM) is a marketing strategy that is aimed at compensating promoters
of selling companies not only for product sales they personally generate, but also for the sales of
others they introduced to the company. Consider a scenario where Alice, who is a representative at
the MLM company, would like to inform the amount of sale to her “upline” distributors (meaning
that all distributors who are higher than her level). In this situation, Alice would like to convince
only people in the “upline” connection, rather than everyone who has a level below her. In this
situation, Alice’s signature on the message must be “designated” to everyone whose level is higher
than her.
Note that at the first glance, the notion of designated verifier signature, as introduced in
[10], might be used to solve this situation by allowing Alice to sign her message multiple times
designated to all members who have higher level than her. Nevertheless, in this situation, Alice
may not know who are the other members whose level are higher than her (other than the one
who is directed above her level, i.e. the person who introduced her to the company). Hence, the
notion of designated verifier signature cannot really solve this problem.
According to the best of our knowledge, there exists no cryptographic primitives that can
be used to solve the above problem efficiently. Therefore, in this work, we introduce the notion
of multi-level controlled signatures to solve the aforementioned problem. We present the security
model to capture this notion, together with two concrete schemes. Our first scheme benefits from
its constant signature size, and this scheme is suitable for an organization where there are many se-
curity levels involved. The second scheme benefits from the short credential involved and therefore,
it is suitable for an organization where the security levels involved are not widely spread.
? This work is supported by the ARC Future Fellowship (FT0991397).
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1.1 Related Work
In this section, we will review some work in the literature that are closely related to our proposed
notion.
The notion of policy-based cryptography was put forth by Bagga and Molva in [1]. This notion
includes policy-based encryption schemes and policy-based signature schemes. In the policy-based
signature schemes, a signer can only sign a message if he/she satisfies the required policy. Policy-
based signatures ensure the security of the scheme from the signer’s point of view, namely message
integrity, authenticity and non-repudiability. In policy-based signatures, any verifier can verify the
authenticity of the message, but nobody can forge the authenticity of the signatures that have
been signed by a signer that satisfies a stated policy. This is in contrast to multi-level controlled
signatures. In multi-level controlled signatures, the policy will guard the verifiers, and hence, only
verifiers who satisfy some policies will be able to verify the authenticity of the message.
The other related notion is the notion of Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption/Signature.
The Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption (HIBE) system [8, 9, 3, 5] is a unified concept between
a hierarchy system and Identity-based Encryption (IBE) system [11, 4] where an identity at level
k of the hierarchical system can issue a private key for its descendant identity, but it cannot
decrypt a message on behalf of other identity except its descendants. At the first sight, it seems
quite straightforward to construct multi-level controlled signatures from HIBE and a standard
signature scheme. This is done as follows. First, a public key generator (PKG) in HIBE assumes
the role of a trusted authority (TA) in the scheme. PKG generates HIBE private keys as credentials
for verifiers. Second, a signer S generates the signature by signing on a concatenation of the
actual message M and some uniformly random dummy message MR in the plaintext space of the
HIBE scheme. Next, by using ID as the security level, S uses HIBE to encrypt MR with ID as
his/her public key. Finally, the multi-level controlled signature consists of the signature on M ||MR
and the HIBE ciphertext of MR. Without having the credentials allowing to decrypt the HIBE
ciphertext and to obtain MR, the signature cannot be verified. The above generic construction
seems to be correct, but unfortunately there is a big drawback to the scheme. If a verifier who
holds the valid credentials (and hence, allowing him/her to decrypt the HIBE ciphertext) exposes
MR with the above signature, then everyone can verify this signature without the need of having
the credentials to decrypt the HIBE ciphertext. This contradicts with the security model of the
multi-level controlled signature, which will be presented in the Section 3. Essentially, this is the
basic security requirement of the multi-level controlled signature to avoid someone from exposing
some information that will be affecting the security of the scheme. Hence, it is clear that the above
generic construction scheme is indeed insecure in the required security model.
The Hierarchical Identity-based Signature (HIBS) scheme [8, 6, 9] is a natural conversion from
the HIBE scheme. Similar to the HIBE, the ancestor identity of the hierarchical system can issue
a private key for its descendant identity. However, it cannot sign on a message on behalf of other
identities except its descendants. The purpose of HIBE systems is to reduce the bottleneck in a
large network, where the PKG of the IBE system is applied, and to limit the scope of key escrow.
For the HIBS, it is, however, similar to policy-based signature schemes where it only provides
for the signer in the message integrity, and the authenticity and non-repudiation but not the
authorization for the verifier.
The other work related to this notion is the designated verifier signature proofs, as mentioned
earlier. It was introduced by Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo in [10]. A proof does not provide
only authentication of a message but it also provides the deniability property that allows the
signer to deny the signature (since the verifier can also generate such a proof). Hence, only the
designated verifier can verify the proof on the message.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we introduce the notion of multi-level controlled signature (MLCS) schemes and
present two concrete constructions of MLCS schemes. The notion of MLCS scheme allows only
receivers, who hold a credential for a certain security level specified by the sender (or signer), to
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verify the authenticity of the signed message. Furthermore, we define and formalize the notion of
MLCS scheme and its security model. Our concrete constructions are proven secure in our model.
Organization of The Paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review some preliminaries that will be
used throughout this paper. In the Section 3, we introduce the definition of MLCS and its security
notions. Next, the first concrete scheme together with its security proof will be provided in Section
4. Then, in the Section 5, we will provide the second concrete scheme and its security proof. Finally,
the comparison of two concrete schemes and conclusion of the paper will be presented in the last
section.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Throughout this paper, the following notations will be used. When we say that a function f : N→
R is negligible, it means that, for all constant c > 0 and for all sufficiently large n, f(n) < 1nc . Let
poly(.) be a deterministic polynomial function. For all polynomials poly(k) and for all sufficiently
large k, we say that q is polynomial-time in k if q ≤ poly(1k). Let l $← L denote the operation of
picking l at random from a (finite) set L.
2.2 Bilinear Pairing
We denote by G1 and G2 cyclic multiplicative groups. Their generators are g1 and g2, respectively.
Let p be a prime and the order of both generators. Let GT be another cyclic multiplicative group
with the same order p. We denote by ê : G1 × G2 → GT a bilinear mapping with the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity: ê(ga1 , g
b
2) = ê(g1, g2)
ab for all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 , a, b ∈ Zp.
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 such that ê(g1, g2) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(g1, g2) for all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2.
Note that there exists ϕ(.) function which maps G1 to G2 or vice versa in one time unit.
2.3 Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1 (Computation Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem). Given a 3-tuple (g, gx, gy ∈
G1) as input, output gx·y. An algorithm A has advantage ε′ in solving the CDH problem if
Pr [A(g, gx, gy) = gx·y] ≥ ε′
where the probability is over the random choice of x, y ∈ Z∗q and the random bits consumed by A.
Assumption 1. Computation Diffie-Hellman Assumption [7, 2] We say that the (t, ε′)-
CDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm with time complexity t(.) has advantage at least ε′
in solving the CDH problem.
Definition 2 (Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem). Given a random 4-
tuple (g, gx, gy, gz) ∈ G1 and a random integer Z ∈ GT as input, decide whether or not Z =
ê(g, g)xyz. An algorithm A is said to (t, ε′) solves the DBDH problem in G1,GT , if A runs in time
t, and∣∣Pr [A (g, gx, gy, gz, Z = ê(g, g)xyz) = 1]− Pr [A (g, gx, gy, gz, Z = ê(g, g)d) = 1]∣∣ ≥ ε′,
where the probability is taken over the random choices of x, y, z, d ∈ Zp, g ∈ G1, and the random
bits consumed by A.
Assumption 2. Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption We say that the (t, ε′)-
DBDH assumption in G1,GT holds if there is no PPT algorithm with time complexity t(.) has
advantage at least ε′ in solving the DBDH problem.
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3 Multi-level Controlled Signature Schemes (MLCS)
Model
Let TA be a trusted authority who issues credentials associated with a security level in the multi-
level security system. In multi-level controlled signature schemes, there are three main players
called a signer, a verifier and a trusted authority TA. A signer S generates a signature, which can
be verified only by a verifier V who holds a credential satisfying the multi-level security policy. TA
is responsible to issue a credential for V . Let AV denote a security level in the multi-level security
policy. We define MP to be a multi-level security policy which contains a policy that indicates a
level of security clearance of the verifier. Without losing generality, we assume that the order of
the security levels is increasing, for example, the higher number is the higher security level3. Let
MP = “AV > n” where n is the number indicated the security level. Generally, we can use other
type of index or symbol to indicate the security level. In the following, we provide a definition of
multi-level controlled signature scheme as follows.
Definition 3. A multi-level controlled signature scheme Σ is an 6-tuple (Setup, TKeyGen, SKeyGen,
CreGen, Sign, V erify) such that
Signature Scheme Setup:
– System Parameters Generation (Setup):
On input a security parameter K, a PPT algorithm named Setup outputs the system pa-
rameters param. That is, param← Setup(1K).
– TA Key Generator (TKeyGen) :
On input the system parameters param, a PPT algorithm named TKeyGen outputs strings
(skTA, pkTA) where they denote a secret key and a public key of trusted authority, respec-
tively. That is,
{pkTA, skTA} ← TKeyGen(param).
– Signer Key Generator (SKeyGen) :
On input the system parameters param, a PPT algorithm named SKeyGen outputs strings
(skS , pkS) where they denote a secret key and a public key of a signer, respectively. That
is, {pkS , skS} ← SKeyGen(param).
– Verifier Credential Generator (CreGen) :
On input the system parameters param, the TA’s public key, and an assertion AV indicated
a security level of verifier, a PPT algorithm named CreGen outputs a credential for verifier
V CR That is, V CR← CreGen(param, pkTA, skTA, AV ).
Multi-level Controlled Signature Signing (Sign):
Sign is a PPT algorithm that, on input the system parameters param, the trusted author-
ity’s public key pkTA, the signer’s secret key skS, the signer’s public key pkS, a message
M and the multi-level security policy MP , it outputs signer’s signature σ. That is, σ ←
Sign(param,M, skS , pkS , pkTA,MP ).
Multi-level Controlled Signature Verification (V erify):
V erify is an algorithm that, on input the system parameters param, the trusted authority’s
public key pkTA, the signer’s public key pkS, the multi-level security policy MP , a credential
V CR, a message M and a signature σ, it outputs a verification decision d ∈ {Accept, Reject}.
That is, d← V erify(param,M, σ, pkTA, pkS ,MP, V CR).
3.1 Security Model
Before modelling the ability of the adversaries in breaking the security of MLCS schemes, we first
describe the oracles used in the security model as follows:
SSO oracle : An adversary A can make at most qS query to SSO for signatures σ on its choice of
a message M . SSO outputs a response by running the Sign algorithm to generate a signature
σ on a message M corresponding with pkTA, pkS and MP . Then, SSO returns σ to A.
3 We note that for a decreasing order security levels, our scheme can be modified trivially.
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VCO oracle : A can make at most qC query to SSO for credentials V CR corresponding to a
security level AV . VCO responds A with a corresponding credential V CR.
VSO oracle : By giving σ,M to VSO as inputs, A can make at most qV query for the verification
of a signature σ. VSO returns with Accept or Reject depending on the validation of signature
σ and the message M .
Unforgeability The unforgeability property of MLCS schemes is to prevent an attacker, who
has an access to the credential oracle, to generate a new multi-level controlled signature σ∗ on a
message M∗. Formally, the unforgeability in this model provides an assurance that one, with an
access to SSO oracle, VCO oracle, the signer’s public parameters pkS and the trusted authority’s
public key, should be unable to produce a new multi-level controlled signature on a message M∗
even with arbitrarily chosen multi-level security policy MP , a message M and the entire credentials
as inputs.
Let CM -A denote the adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack and let EUF -MLCS
denote the existential unforgeability of MLCS scheme. The following experiment between the ad-
versary ACM-AEUF -MLCS and a simulator F models a security against existential unforgeability under
the adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack.
With an adaptive strategy, A arbitrarily makes queries to SSO and VCO oracle on its choice
of a message M . Let V CR be the credentials for the entire security level. After the queries process,
assume that A outputs a forged signature σ∗ on a message M∗ with respect to the public key pkS
and multi-level security policy MP ∗. A wins the experiment if:
1. Accept← V erify(M∗, σ∗, pkS ,MP ∗, V CR).
2. σ∗ is not the output of that A previously made a request to SSO oracle.
Let SuccCM-AEUF -MLCS(.) be the success probability function of that ACM-AEUF -MLCS wins the above
experiment.
Definition 4. A MLCS scheme is (t,qH ,qS,qC ,ε)-secure existentially unforgeable under a chosen
message and credential exposure attack if there are no PPT adversary ACM-AEUF -MLCS such that the
success probability SuccCM-AEUF -MLCS(k) = ε is negligible in k, where ACM-AEUF -MLCS runs in time at
most t, makes at most qH hash queries, qS signing queries, and qC verification queries.
Coalition-resistance In this section, we will describe the coalition-resistant property of MLCS
schemes. This property is to prevent an attacker, as a group of corrupted credential holders (ver-
ifiers), to verify a multi-level controlled signature σ∗ on a message M
∗ with a multi-level security
policy MP , in which the attacker does not have a credential satisfied the security level indicated
in MP .
Let CR-MLCS denote the existential coalition-resistance of MLCS scheme. Let ACMP−ACRI−PCS
be the adaptively chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy distinguisher and let F
be a simulator. The following game between F and A describes the existential coalition-resistance
of MLCS scheme under a chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy attack. We divide
the game into two phases and run them as follows:
1. Phase 1 : With any adaptive strategies, A arbitrarily issues a request of queries to SSO and
VCO oracles. The oracles response as per their design.
2. Challenge : After the first phase, A outputs M∗ and MP ∗ = “AV ≥ l” such that:
a. On input MP ∗ and M∗, A never issued a request for a multi-level controlled signature to
SSO queries.
b. With MP ∗ = “AV ≥ l”, A can issue a request of credential to VCO queries for a security
level AV < l.
If the above condition is satisfied, F chooses a random bit b $← {0, 1}. If b = 1 then, on input
a multi-level security policy MP ∗ and a message M∗, F issues a request for a multi-level
controlled signature to SSO queries. Then F responds A with σ∗ as an output from SSO
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queries. Otherwise, on input a multi-level security policy MP ∗, a message M∗, a valid policy-
controlled signature σ on message M∗ with policy MP ∗ and a credentials V CR, F computes
a (simulated) invalid multi-level controlled signature σ∗. Then F responds A with σ∗.
3. Phase 2 : In this phase, A can arbitrarily return to Phase 1 or Challenge. With one condition,
at least one set of challenges M∗,MP ∗, σ∗ must be valid and satisfy the condition in the
challenge phase.
4. Guessing : A finally outputs a guess b′ based on a challenge M∗,MP ∗, σ∗. The distinguisher
wins the game if b = b′.
We denote by SuccCMP -ACR-MLCS(.) the success probability function of that ACMP -ACR-MLCS wins the above
experiment.
Definition 5. A MLCS scheme is (t,qH ,qS,qC ,ε)-secure existentially coalition-resistance under
a chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy attack if there are no PPT distinguisher
ACMP -ACR-MLCS such that the success probability SuccCMP -ACR-MLCS(k)= |Pr[b = b′] − Pr[b 6= b′]| = ε is
negligible in k, where ACMP -ACR-MLCS runs in time at most t, make at most qH hash queries, qS signing
queries, and qC verification queries.
4 The First MLCS Scheme
In this section, we present our first concrete construction of MLCS schemes. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G1
be a collision-resistant hash function. Let h : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p be a collision-resistant hash function.
Let G1 and GT denote two groups of prime order p. Let ê be the bilinear mapping function, which
maps G1 to GT . The above mapping function is defined as ê : G1 × G1 → GT . The scheme is
described as follows.
Setup : On input a security parameter K, a trusted third party randomly chooses a prime p ≈
poly(1K). Choose a random generator g ∈ G1 and a bilinear mapping function ê. Select two
hash functions H(.) and h(.) Let us denote by param = (p, ê, g,H, h) the system parameters.
Then, Setup returns param.
TKeyGen : Let n be a number of security levels. On input a system parameters param, a trusted
authority TA randomly generates a private key skTA and a public key pkTA for each security
level as follows: select random integers µ1, ..., µn, γ1, ..., γn, a, b, c1, ..., cn ∈ Zp. Let pkTA =
(U1 = g
µ1 , ..., Un = g
µn ,W1 = g
γ1 , ...,Wn = g
γn ,A = ga,B = gb) denote a public key. Then,
TKeyGen returns skTA = (µ1, ..., µn, γ1, ..., γn, a, b, c1, ..., cn) as a private key of the trusted
authority and pkTA = (U1, ..., Un,W1, ...,Wn,A,B) as a public key of the trusted authority.
SKeyGen : On input a system parameters param, a signer S randomly generates a private key
skS and a public key pkS as follows. First, choose a random integer x ∈ Zp. Let X = gx;W =
Ax;U = Bx denote a public key. Then, SKeyGen set skS = x as a private key of the signer
and pkS = (X,W,U) as a public key of the signer. Finally, SKeyGen returns skS , pkS .
CreGen : Let AV indicate a security level of verifier, for example, AV =“D”. On input a system
parameters param, the trusted authority’s public key pkTA, the trusted authority’s private key
skTA and a security level of verifier AV = l that verifier is satisfied to obtain, a trusted au-
thority TA randomly generates a set of credential strings V CR = (CV1, ..., CVl, CR1, ..., CRl),
where i is an index of security level, as follows: TA randomly selects ν1, ..., νl ∈ Z∗p and
computes each credential CVi = g
ci·νi ; CRi = g
(µi·γi−µi−1·γi−1−a·ci·νi)/(b) and then returns
V CR = (CV1, ..., CVl, CR1, ..., CRl) to the verifier as a credential for a security level assertion
AV = l. The verifier checks the validity of each CVi and CRi as follows:
ê(Ui,Wi)
?
= ê(A, CVi)ê(B, CRi)ê(Ui−1,Wi−1).
Sign : Given param, pkTA, skS , pkS , MP = “AV ≥ l” and a message M , S computes a multi-level
controlled signature σ on a message M as follows:
r, k
$← Zp, σ1 = gr, σ2 = Xr, σ3 = Wr, σ4 = Ur,
Γ = σ1||σ2||σ3||σ4||pkS ||pkTA||MP, σ5 = gk, σ6 = H(Γ )x,
σ7 = h(ê(Ul,Wl)
x·r) + h(M ||Γ ||σ5), σ8 = k + σ7 · x.
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The multi-level controlled signature on a message M is σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6, σ7, σ8). S
publishes M,σ,MP .
V erify : Let V CR = CV1, ..., CVl, CR1, ..., CRl, be a set of credentials that verifier possessed.
Parse Γ = σ1||σ2||σ3||σ4||pkS ||pkTA||MP . Given pkS , pkTA, pkV , V CR, MP = “AV ≥ l”, σ
and a message M , a verifier V checks whether
ê(σ1,X)
?
= ê(σ2, g), ê(σ3, g)
?
= ê(σ2,A), ê(σ4, g)
?
= ê(σ2,B),
ê(σ6, g)
?
= ê(H(Γ ),X), gσ8 ?= σ5 · Xσ7
σ7
?
= h(M ||Γ ||σ5) + h(ê(σ3,
l∏
i=1
CVi)ê(σ4,
l∏
i=1
CRi)),
hold. If it does not hold, then V outputs reject. Otherwise, it outputs accept.
4.1 Security Analysis
Unforgeability
Theorem 1. The above multi-level controlled signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under
an adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack if the CDH assumption holds in the
random oracle model.
Proof. Assume that there exists a forger algorithm A running the existentially unforgeable game
defined in Section 3.1. Then we will show that, by using A, an adversary F solves the CDH
problem.
We now begin with the the construction of oracles. To begin with, F runs Setup and TKeyGen
to obtain a system parameter param, a secret key skTA and a public key of TA. Next, on input
g, gx and gy as an instance of the CDH problem, F sets X = gx;W = Xa;U = Xb as the signer
public key pkS . F sets gy as one of the answers for the hash query to the random oracle. Then, F
construct oracles as follows:
HO oracle: On input a string Γ , if it is a request for a hash value of H(Γ ), HO oracle randomly
choose d
$← {0, 1} such that the probability of d = 1 is 1qH . If d = 1, set H(Γ ) = g
y and return
H(Γ ). Otherwise, l
$← Zp; H(Γ ) = gl and return H(Γ ). In case of h(Γ ), HO chooses ι
$← Zp
and then returns h(Γ ) = ι. Then HO keeps l and ι in the list and this list can be accessed
only by F .
VCO queries : On input a secret key skTA, VCO runs CreGen to generate the credential V CR
for the security level assertion AV = l and then returns V CR.
SSO queries : On input MP = “AV ≥ l” and a message M , SSO computes a multi-level
controlled signature as follows:
r, k
$← Zp, σ1 = gr, σ2 = Xr, σ3 = Wr, σ4 = Ur,
Γ = σ1||σ2||σ3||σ4||pkS ||pkTA||MP.
Before processing the next step, on access to the list of l and ι, F checks whether H(Γ ) ?= gy. If
it holds, output ⊥. Otherwise, F gives l to SSO. Next, F randomly selects ι′ $← Zp; K
$← G1
and F adds ι′, h(M ||Γ ||K) to the list. Then, F returns K to SSO. As a result, SSO computes
the rest of signature as follows:
z
$← Zp, σ8 = z, σ6 = Xl, σ7 = h(ê(X,Wl)µl·r) + h(M ||Γ ||K), σ5 = gσ8X−σ7 .
At the end of the process, on input σ5 from SSO, F updates ι′, h(M ||Γ ||σ5) to the list. Hence,
a multi-level controlled signature on message M is σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6, σ7, σ8). SSO then
responds with M,σ,MP .
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Now, we begin the game by giving an access to the above oracles to A. Assume that A always
makes a query for a string or a message to HO oracle before it outputs a potential forgery, denoted
by M∗, σ∗,MP ∗. After executing an adaptive strategy with the above oracles, A outputs a forgery
σ∗ on a message M∗ with respect to MP ∗. A wins the game if a multi-level controlled signature
σ∗ on message M∗ with respect to MP ∗ is valid and is not an output from the SSO queries.
We denote by ε the success probability SuccCM-AEUF -MLCS(.) that A wins the game. Let e be the
base of the natural logarithm. As we mentioned early, a query for a hash of a string or message
to HO is always issued before A issues a query for a signature to SSO queries, hence, qH ≥ qS .
Now, we can analyze the success probability that A outputs a signature σ∗ on message M∗ with
respect to MP ∗, where σ∗6 = H(Γ )
x = (gy)x, and wins the above game as follows:
– E1: F does not abort during the issuing of queries to the SSO. The probability of this event
Pr[E1] is (1− 1qH )
qS . It is because A needs to have at least one query for H(Γ ) to output σ∗6
which is a part of forgery. Since qH ≥ qS , the upper bound for SSO queries is then qH − 1
and Pr[E1] ≥ (1− 1qH )
qH−1 ≈ qHe·(qH−1) .
– E2: F does not abort after A output σ∗. F aborts the experiment after A output σ∗ when only
H(Γ ) 6= gy. Therefore, the probability of this event is greater than (1− 1qH )
qH−1 ≈ qHe·(qH−1) .
To summarize the probability, A wins the above game and outputs a signature σ∗ on a mes-
sage M∗, where H(Γ ) = gy and σ∗6 = H(Γ )
x, with a probability equal to Pr[SuccCM-AEUF -MLCS ] ·
Pr[SuccCM-AEUF -MLCS |E1|E2] ≥ ε(
qH
e·(qH−1) )
2. From the above results, F outputs σ∗6 = H(Γ )x = gxy as
an answer to CDH problem and the above success probability shows that our multi-level controlled
signature scheme secures against existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message and
credential exposure attack if the success probability of solving CDH problem is negligible.
Coalition-resistance
Theorem 2. The above multi-level controlled signature scheme is existentially coalition-resistance
against the adaptively chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy distinguisher ACMP -ACR-MLCS
if the DBDH assumption is hold in the random oracle model.
Due to the page limitation, please find the proof for Theorem 2 in the full version of this paper
[12].
5 The Second MLCS Scheme
In this section, we present the second construction of MLCS schemes. The scheme is described as
follows.
Setup : On input a security parameter K, a trusted third party randomly selects a prime p ≈
poly(1K). Choose a random generator g ∈ G1 and a bilinear mapping function ê. Select two
hash functions H(.) and h(.) Let param = (p, ê, g,H, h) denote the system parameters. Then,
Setup returns param.
TKeyGen : Let n be a number of security levels. On input a system parameters param, a trusted
authority TA randomly generates a private key skTA and a public key pkTA for each security
level as follows: select random integers µ, a, b, w1, ..., wn ∈ Zp. Let pkTA = (U = gµ,A =
ga,B = gb,W1 = gw1 , ...,Wn = gwn denote a public key. Then, TKeyGen returns skTA =
(µ, a, b, w1, ..., wn) as a private key of the trusted authority and pkTA = (A,B, U,W1, ...,Wn, )
as a public key of the trusted authority.
SKeyGen : On input a system parameters param, a signer S randomly generates a private key
skS and a public key pkS as follows. Choose a random integer x ∈ Zp. Let set pkS = (X =
gx,U = Ux,W1 = W x1 , ...,Wn = W xn ) to a public key. Then, SKeyGen returns skS = x as a
private key of the signer and pkS = (X,U,W1, ...,Wn) as a public key of the signer.
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CreGen : Let AV indicates a security level of verifier. On input a system parameters param, the
trusted authority’s public key pkTA, the trusted authority’s private key skTA and a security
level of verifier AV = l that verifier is satisfied to obtain, a trusted authority TA randomly
generates a credential strings V CR = (CV,CR) as follows: TA randomly selects s ∈ Z∗p and
computes each credential CV = gs; CR = g((a·b−s·µ)/wl) and then returns V CR = (CV,CR)
to the verifier as a credential for a security level assertion AV = l. Verifier checks the validity
of CV,CR as follows:
ê(A,B) ?= ê(U,CV )ê(Wl, CR).
Sign : Given param, pkTA, skS , pkS , MP = “AV ≥ l” and a message M , S computes a multi-level
controlled signature σ on a message M as follows:
r, k
$← Zp, σ1 = gr, σ2 = Xr, σ3 = (Wrl , ...,Wrn)σ4 = Ur,
Γ = σ1||σ2||σ3||σ4||pkS ||pkTA||MP,
σ5 = g
k, σ6 = H(Γ )
x, σ7 = h(ê(A,B)x·r) + h(M ||Γ ||σ5), σ8 = k + σ7 · x.
The multi-level controlled signature on a message M is σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6, σ7, σ8). S
publishes M,σ,MP .
V erify : Let V CR = (CV,CR) be a credential that verifier possessed for a security level “AV =
t”, where l ≤ t ≤ n. Let prase Γ = σ1||σ2||σ3||σ4||pkS ||pkTA ||MP Given pkS , pkTA, pkV ,
V CR, MP = “AV ≥ l”, σ and a message M , a verifier V checks whether, for i = l to n,
ê(σ3,i, g)
?
= ê(σ2,Wi) and, then, check whether
ê(σ1,X)
?
= ê(σ2, g), ê(σ4, g)
?
= ê(σ2, U), ê(σ6, g)
?
= ê(H(Γ ),X),
σ7
?
= h(M ||Γ ||σ5) + h(ê(σ4, CV )ê(σ3,t, CR)), gσ8
?
= σ5 · Xσ7
hold. If it does not hold, then V outputs reject. Otherwise, it outputs accept.
5.1 Security Analysis
Unforgeability
Theorem 3. Our second multi-level controlled signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under
an adaptive chosen message and credential exposure attack if the CDH assumption holds in the
random oracle model.
Proof. Assume that there exists a forger algorithm A running the existentially unforgeability
game defined in Section 3.1. Then we will show that, by using A, an adversary F solves the CDH
problem.
We now begin with the the construction of oracles. To begin with, F runs Setup and TKeyGen
to obtain a system parameter param, a secret key skTA and a public key of TA. Next, on input g,
gx and gy as an instance of the CDH problem, F sets X = gx;U = Xµ;W1 = Xw1 ; ...;Wn = Xwn
as the signer public key pkS . F sets gy as one of the answers for the hash query to the random
oracle. Then, F constructs oracles as follows:
HO oracle: On input a string Γ , if it is a request for a hash value of H(Γ ), HO oracle randomly
choose d
$← {0, 1} such that the probability of d = 1 is 1qH . If d = 1, set H(Γ ) = g
y and return
H(Γ ). Otherwise, l
$← Zp; H(Γ ) = gl and return H(Γ ). In case of h(Γ ), HO chooses ι
$← Zp
and then returns h(Γ ) = ι. Then HO keeps l and ι in the list and this list can be accessed
only by F .
VCO queries : On input a secret key skTA, VCO runs CreGen to generate the credential V CR
for the security level assertion AV = l and then returns V CR.
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SSO queries : On input MP = “AV ≥ l” and a message M , SSO computes a multi-level
controlled signature as follows:
r, k
$← Zp, σ1 = gr, σ2 = Xr, σ3 = (Wrl , ...,Wrn), σ4 = Ur,
Γ = σ1||σ2||σ3||σ4||pkS ||pkTA||MP.
Before processing the next step, on access to the list of l and ι, F checks whether H(Γ ) ?= gy).
If hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, F gives l to SSO. Next, F randomly selects ι′ $← Zp; K
$← G1
and F adds ι′, h(M ||Γ ||K) to the list. Then, F returns K to SSO. As a result, SSO computes
the rest of signature as follows:
z
$← Zp, σ8 = z, σ6 = Xl, σ7 = h(ê(X,A)b·r) + h(M ||Γ ||K), σ5 = gσ8X−σ7 .
In the end of the process, on input σ5 from SSO, F updates ι′, h(M ||Γ ||σ5) to the list. Hence,
a multi-level controlled signature on message M is σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6, σ7, σ8). SSO then
responds with M,σ,MP .
Now, we begin the game by giving an access to the above oracles to A. Assume that A always
make a query for a string or a message to HO oracle before it outputs a potential forgery, denoted
by M∗, σ∗,MP ∗. After executing an adaptive strategy with the above oracles, A outputs a forgery
σ∗ on a message M∗ with respect to MP ∗. A wins the game if a multi-level controlled signature
σ∗ on message M∗ with respect to MP ∗ is valid and is not an output from the SSO queries.
We denote by ε the success probability SuccCM-AEUF -MLCS(.) that A wins the game. Let e be the
base of the natural logarithm. As we mentioned early, a query for a hash of a string or message
to HO is always issued before A issues a query for a signature to SSO queries, hence, qH ≥ qS .
Now, we can analyze the success probability that A outputs a signature σ∗ on message M∗ with
respect to MP ∗, where σ∗6 = H(Γ )
x = (gy)x, and wins the above game as follows:
– E1: F does not abort during the issuing of queries to the SSO. The probability of this event
Pr[E1] is (1− 1qH )
qS . It is because A needs to have at least one query for H(Γ ) to output σ∗6
which is a part of forgery. Since qH ≥ qS , the upper bound for SSO queries is then qH − 1
and Pr[E1] ≥ (1− 1qH )
qH−1 ≈ qHe·(qH−1) .
– E2: F does not abort after A output σ∗. F aborts the experiment after A output σ∗ when only
H(Γ ) 6= gy. Therefore, the probability of this event is greater than (1− 1qH )
qH−1 ≈ qHe·(qH−1) .
To summarize the probability, A wins the above game and outputs a signature σ∗ on a mes-
sage M∗, where H(Γ ) = gy and σ∗6 = H(Γ )
x, with a probability equal to Pr[SuccCM-AEUF -MLCS ] ·
Pr[SuccCM-AEUF -MLCS |E1|E2] ≥ ε(
qH
e·(qH−1) )
2. From the above results, F outputs σ∗6 = H(Γ )x = gxy as
an answer to CDH problem and the above success probability shows that our multi-level controlled
signature scheme secures against existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message and
credential exposure attack if the success probability of solving CDH problem is negligible.
Coalition-resistance
Theorem 4. Our second multi-level controlled signature scheme is existentially coalition-resistance
against the adaptively chosen message and chosen multi-level security policy distinguisher ACMP -ACR-MLCS
if the DBDH assumption is hold in the random oracle model.
Due to the page limitation, please find the proof for Theorem 4 in the full version of this paper
[12].
6 Conclusion
We presented a security model for MLCS schemes to capture the message integrity and authentic-
ity, together with authorization of the verifiers. Two concrete schemes and their proof of security
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have been presented. A signature of the first scheme has a constant size. A private information
(credentials) of verifier is shorter in the second scheme. Our schemes are shown to be secure in our
model. The comparison between the two schemes is provided in Fig 1. It is interesting to study
how to provide a constant size signature while the size of verifier’s credential is also constant.
Moreover, it is also interesting to study how to construct MLCS schemes in the standard model.
We discussed the insecure generic construction from HIBE, however, it is also interesting to study
how to construct a generic construction scheme that will be secure in our model such that the
verification can be done only by an appropriate verifier. Note that, in Fig 1, l is a security level
in the multi-level security policy where MP = “AV ≥ l”. n is the number of security level. Let E
denote a computation of exponential in G1 or GT . Let M be a computation of multiplication in
G1. Let P be a computation of bilinear pairing function ê.
Version / Size of First Scheme Second Scheme
PKTA (2n + 2)|G1| (n + 3)|G1|
SKTA (3n + 2)|p| (n + 3)|p|
PKS 3|G1| (n + 1)|G1|
SKS |p| |p|
V CRV (2l)|G1| 2|G1|
Signature 6|G1|+ 2|p| (5 + n− l)|G1|+ 2|p|
Signing Computation 7E + M + P (6 + n− l)E + M + P
Verification Computation E + 2lM + 10P E + (2(n− l) + 8)P
Fig. 1. The comparison of two concrete schemes.
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